A point of sale case study of Home Depot,
brought to you by IBM. In this video, you will understand the
timeline of events of the point of sale, or POS attack. Learn about what actions were
taken by the threat actors, and learn what the impacts
are from a POS attack. If we explore the summary of the attack, we will find a couple of similarities to
the target attack, which occurred in 2013. Home Depot is one of the many victims
to a retail data breach in 2014. The unfortunate thing is the way the
attackers infiltrated the POS networks, and how the attackers were able
to steal the payment card data, included some of the same methods
used in the target data breach. The attackers were able to gain access to
one of Home Depot's vendor environments, by using a third-party
vendors login credentials. Once they were in the Home Depot network,
they were able to install memory scraping malware on over 7500
self-checkout POS terminals. This malware was able to grab the data
from 56 million credit and debit cards. The malware was also able to
capture 53 million email addresses. The stolen payment cards were used to
put up for sale, and bought by carders. Carders are active participants on
websites referred to as carding forums. Most carding forums facilitate
the sale of stolen identities, compromised credit card numbers,
and false logins. The stolen email addresses were helpful in
putting together large phishing campaigns. Next, let's take a look at
the timeline of the attack. As we discussed, the stolen credentials
from one of the retailer's vendors was used to obtain access to the network. Those privileges were elevated,
and used to access the POS system where malware was downloaded
to record credit card details. The malware infection went unnoticed for
five months between April and September 2014. Home Depot explained that the
investigation started on September 2nd, and they were still trying to discover
the actual scope and impact of the breach. On September 8th,
2014 Home Depot released a statement, indicating that its payment
card systems were breached. Home Depot explained that they would be
offering free credit services to affected customers who use their payment
card as early as April of 2014, and apologized for the data breach. Once the attackers gain access
to the Home Depot network, they exploited a zero-day vulnerability in
Windows, which allowed them to pivot from the vendor specific environment,
to the Home Depot corporate environment. A zero-day vulnerability is a computer
software vulnerability that is unknown to, or unaddressed by those who should
be interested in mitigating the vulnerability, including
the vendor of the target software. Until the vulnerability is mitigated,
hackers can exploit it to adversely affect computer programs, data,
additional computers, or a network. This previously unknown weakness
within Microsoft Windows enabled the attackers to escalate privileges
move laterally through the network, and identify 7500 self-checkout lanes. There were several countermeasures
Home Depot could have had in place to prevent
the breach from happening, and to have been able to detect
the breach sooner, minimizing the impact. Vulnerability management, there was no
proof of regularly scheduled vulnerability scanning of the POS environment. Furthermore, research indicates Home Depot
did not have a vulnerability management program. Performing monthly vulnerability
scans of the POS environment, they could have used the results of those
scans to show management the significance of the gaps in that environment,
and possibly started to mitigate the risk of the environment
before the breach occurred. System configuration, Home Depot didn't
have secure configuration of the software, or hardware, and the POS terminals. They didn't have a proper network
segregation between the Home Depot corporate network, and the POS network. The lack of network segregation was
another big gap in this breach. Home Depot should have had the POS
environment on its own restrictive virtualized local area network, or VLAN. Home Depot did have Symantec endpoint
protection installed in their environment. But the problem is, they did not have
important feature turned on in the product called network threat protection. Another secure configuration missing was
the use of point-to-point encryption. The operating system running in
the POS devices was Windows XP. At the time, Windows XP machines
were highly vulnerable to attacks. So the fact that Home Depot's POS
registers were still running this operating system added to their
vulnerability to attack credentials. Home Depot is not properly managed as
third party vendor credentials, and should it allowed only minimal
access to that vendor account. We have discussed in earlier courses
the principle of least privilege. An important concept in computer security
is the practice of limiting access rights for users to the bare minimum permissions
they need to perform their work. Even if Home Depot couldn't
have prevented the attack, they still should have had
monitoring capabilities, so that it did not take five
months to detect an intrusion. Having the capability to forward any
network, or host activity in the POS environment to a Sim would have
been beneficial to Home Depot, and could have allowed them to detect
the breach sooner minimizing the impact. So what were the estimated
costs of the Home Depot breach? The Home Depot data breach was huge. It was the largest retail data breach
involving a point of sale system that has been seen so far. Malware had been downloaded that allowed
cybercriminals to obtain over 50 million credit card numbers from
Home Depot customers, and around 53 million email addresses. Home Depot agreed to pay out 19.5 million
to customers that have been impacted by the breach. The payout include the cost of providing
credit monitoring services to those affected by the breach. Home Depot has also paid out a minimum of a 134.5 million to credit
card companies and banks. The settlement amount permitted banks and
credit card companies to submit claims for $2 per compromised credit card, without
having to show proof of losses suffered. If banks can show losses, they will
have up to 60% of losses compensated. The total cost of the retail data
breach is approximately 179. And although that figure did not
incorporate all legal fees that Home Depot had to pay, and neither does it include
undisclosed settlements, the final cost of the retail data breach was much bigger,
most likely closer to 200 million mark. What's harder to determine
is the reputation damage. Following any data breach, customers often take their
business to a different company. Many consumers impacted by the breach
have chosen to shop elsewhere. A number of studies have been carried
out in the follow-up from a data breach. One high trust study states that
the companies may lose 51% of customers, following a breach of sensitive data. In addition to the additional
vulnerabilities mentioned to putting together vulnerability management program,
and identifying the least privileged, each person needs to access systems. After the Target and Home Depot breaches,
a new type of credit card was beginning to replace the traditional magnetic strip,
which was common in the United States. The chip and pin card, which contains
an embedded security chip, in addition to the traditional magstripe, this embedded
security trip ensures that the card cannot be duplicated, as it masks the payment
data uniquely for each transaction. In addition to chip cards, vendors
began promoting alternate method to payment cards, using mobile payment
methods like Apple Pay and Google Wallet. This smart device could be a phone,
tablet, or even a watch. With both of these mobile payment systems, they never pass your credit
card number to the margin. Additional security was also provided
by point-to-point, or P2P encryption. P2P encryption encrypts card
data at the point of the swipe, all the way to the bank for
approval or denial of the transaction. With P2P encryption,
payment card data is never exposed, and is encrypted before it reaches memory. The only risk that still remains with P2P
encryption is if someone were to install a credit card skimmer
on the actual pin pad. Which is still occurring in 2020,
primarily at gas stations, and places where the keypad does not
have an in-person attendant. These alternate methods were
outcomes in the most common method used in the large-scale retail breaches. Next item,
we'll explore third-party breaches, and I will be back to discuss
the quest data breach.